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This paper has two purposes, first to discuss the nature 
of ethics (or moral philosophy, I take these terms to be 
equivalent) and second to examine the notion of moral 
status in general and in particular the moral status of 
nonhuman animals.l 
The practical importance of the second purpose will 
be apparent to readers of this joumal. But the fIrst purpose 
must come first, I believe, in order to counter a number 
of fundamental but widespreadmisconceptions ofethics. 
It is widely believed that ethics is relative to particular 
cultures in a way that science is not, or that ethics is not, 
as science is, objective, or that ethics is somehow 
intrinsically emotional. These beliefs lead to the 
conclusion that rational and productive work on ethical 
questions is just not possible. If rational justification of 
ethical positions is taken to be impossible, one need not 
concern oneself with the justification of one's treatment 
of illlimalS. Those who object to accepted, customary, 
uses of illlimals are just being "emotional." 
I 
What is ethics? Ethics is a field of study (or the content 
of that field) concerned with what ought to be or with 
what we ought to do. We may distinguish between an 
ethics ofaction, addressed to the question "What should 
we do?" or "What ought to be done?" and an ethics of 
virtue in which the central question is "What ought we 
be?" or "How shall we live?" In many contexts, and on 
many theories, these are simply variant approaches to 
the same goal. We should be the sorts of people who 
freely choose to act in the way we ought to act. We 
ought to do those things we would naturally choose if 
wewere the right sort ofpeople. Until the last few years, 
much of modern moral philosophy, at least in the 
English-speaking world, has emphasized the ethics of 
action much more than the ethics of virtue. In this paper 
the distinction will be of little importance.2 
Ethics, then, is concerned with what ought to be 
(what we ought to do, what we ought to be, the right 
and the wrong). Science, taken very generally, is 
concerned with what is (what the world is like, the true 
and the false). There is more to science than a collection 
of facts. Even if it were possible for us to know and to 
express all the truths there are, a complete listing of 
them would not constitute an adequate science. At a 
minimum, there is an additional need to subsume 
particular truths under general laws. And further, a 
proposed law of science may cover all the relevant 
phenomena yet still be unsatisfactory if it lacks 
explanatory force. It is important to stress this. The 
concerns of science are not limited to covering facts; 
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the facts are also to be explained. Inattemion to this 
essential prut of tlle mission of science conl1ibutes to 
the mistaken belief that moral philosophy (and 
philosophy in general) is radically unlike science. 
Science and philosophy are bOtll aUempts to make 
sense of our world, to explain things. In l1le Greek 
origins of Westem philosophy and science tile two are 
sometimes inextricably intermixed and sometimes just 
indistinguishable. AltllOUgh today it is quite easy to 
distinguish some sorts of sciemific activity from some 
sorts of philosophical activity, it is still true tlmt many, 
perhaps most, of the most interesting scientific questions 
either just are philosophical questions or border on and 
shade into philosophical questions. 
In principle, tlle bedrock of science is observation. 
Scientific tlleory must aCCOulll for tlle observations, save 
tlle phenomena. Observations are not simply glances, 
glimpses, or impressions. Not everyl1ling someone 
claims to have seen, observed, or just come to believe 
counts as an observation. Putative observations have 
to measure up to certain standards, which may be more 
or less well-defined, depending on tlle field. We are 
quite willing to tllrow out supposed observations as 
simply mistaken, biased, fraudulent, hallucinatory, or 
otherwise spurious. 
A theory constructed to account for a set of 
observations may end up presenting an explanatory 
framework tllat includes most of tlle observations, but 
leaves some of them out. What happens in these 
situations? Suppose our tlleory covers 95% of the 
observations, but cannot account for tlle remaining 5%. 
We of course simply reject tlle deviant 5% as due to 
"experimental enol''' of some unknown sort. In otller 
words, even though observations are basic, we are quite 
willing to sacrifice observations to tlleoretical simplicity 
and/or explanatory power. 
The tlleoretical structure of science tllat I have just 
sketched in a manner botll crude and idealized is 
exactly parallel, I shall argue, to the theoretical 
structure of etllics. 
Conesponding to scientific observations are our 
"intuitions" of right and wrong, good and bad. Just as 
observations are not gl~U1ces or momentary impressions, 
so intuitions are not just transitory emotions or 
responses. Intuitions are our retlective evaluations, our 
approvals and disapprovals "in a cool hour" (to use 
Hume's phrase). Ifone's upbringing has been deficient 
in a certain way, one may at first react to tlle sight of a 
racially mixed couple with unretlective disapproval. 
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However, one may well, upon very brief retlection, 
reject one's own reaction and replace it by tlle intuition 
tlmt there is nothing amiss. Why would one reject one's 
initial reaction? Because one is unable to justify it on 
the basis of moral theories or principles that one 
accepts as otherwise satisfactory. Moral theories are 
satisfactory if and to the extent that they account for 
most, or tlle most central of, our intuitions, if they 
possess explanatory power, and so on. At a high level 
of generality tlle criteria for the adequacy of moral 
tlleories are the same as those for the adequacy of 
scientific theories. 
My intuitions can, over time, change as a result of 
my acceptance of a moral theory or some elements of 
a moral theory and as a result of other factors. What I 
perceive (intuit) as right and wrong, good and bad, is 
obviously intluenced by my upbringing, my antecedent 
beliefs bOtll moral and factual, by my culture, and by 
the views of friends and family. That is, my moral 
illluitions are significantly affected by a wide range of 
prior corrunitrnents and inclinations. And something 
very similar is true of scientific observations. It is 
hm'dly news, at this date, to be told tllat scientific 
observations are "tlleory-laden" and subject to bias from 
many sources. We see what we are looking for, we 
categorize our experience and perceive our environ­
ment witllin tlle limits of the conceptual frameworks 
we bring Witll us to tlle laboratory, to tlle classroom, 
to tlle market. We see what we look for, and we can 
see only what we are ready for. This point is at least 
as old as Kant and has been a commonplace in the 
philosophy of science since the 1950s. When a physicist 
looks at a cloud chamber, or a neuroscientist at a brain 
tissue section, tlley see more than ml ignorant observer 
such as myself. I may see a beautiful pattern, perhaps, 
but no more, while the physicist sees alpha particles 
and tlle neuroscientist sees old and new cortex. Those 
things are really there, and my eyesight is quite 
adequate, but I can't see them because I don't possess 
the relevant theory. (Because the patterns have 
meaning for tlle scientists it may be more difficult for 
tllCm to appreciate tlle sort of beauty I may see in the 
images.) Our commitments, our inclinations, our 
theories intluence our scientific observations and our 
moral intuitions alike. 
It may not be mniss at tllis point, since I have just 
mentioned tlle intluence on one's ethical intuitions of 
one's cultural background, to tum to the claim that 
different cultures have different ethics. It is of course 
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true Ulat different cultures may well instill in their 
members different beliefs about right and wrong. But 
it certainly does not follow that all Ulese beliefs are 
equally correct. Different cultures may instill in Uleir 
members different scientific beliefs. If Cora Du Bois 
is correct, the Alorese in the late 1930s believed iliat 
numerous acts of intercourse were necessary for Ule 
formation of a human fetus and, thus, iliat a single act 
of intercourse could not suffice for the birth of achild.3 
The Alorese were just mistaken. The cultural 
transmission of a belief is no evidence for its 
correctness. Some at least ofmy ancestors believed that 
buman slavery (of "inferior races") was morally 
acceptable, and this belief was culturally transmitted. 
They were wrong. A society can embody and transmit 
false eUlical beliefs just as it can embody and transmit 
false scientific beliefs. My ancestors' slavery-justifying 
beliefs were no more true than were the Alorese 
reproductive beliefs. 
People sometimes use a curious locution of Ule fonn 
"true for X," where X is some person or group, and 
would say Ulat the belief tllat slavery is justified was 
true for my great-grandfather. But to say tllat some belief 
of mine is true for me is eiUler just to say tllat I believe 
it or is evidence of some deep muddle about tlle relation 
between trutll and belief. To suggest Ulat slavery was 
morally justified for my ancestors, because they 
believed it was, is exactly as sensible a~ suggesting tllat 
Alorese reproductive physiology was different from 
that of contemporary Italians, because Alorese and 
Italian beliefs differed. Cultures can just be mistaken, 
as can individuals. And mistakes, by cultures or 
individuals, need not be criminal and may in some 
cases be almost inescapable. 
(That two cultures have coamcting moral rules 
need not mean that eiUler is incon·eet. There are some 
matters about which it is import.lnt to have a rule, but 
exactly which rule is chosen is morally indifferent. 
Such cases are common in tlle law. It is essential to 
specify which side of Ule road traffic will keep to, but 
eitller side will do.) 
There is scientific progress, and there is moral 
progress. The buman race is, in general, more free of 
unjustified discrimination tllan it was 50 years ago. 
Freedom of speech is more widely recognized, at least 
on paper. The rights of individuals to deviate from the 
norm, to be left alone, and to have their special needs 
met, are more widely granted. We are, as a species, less 
racist and less sexist tllCUl we used to be. Slavery is 
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tolerated almost nowhere. This is moral progress. 
Moral progress is not as striking and perhaps not as 
widespread as scientific and technological progress, 
but it has been made. 
It has been claimed that scientific disputes are 
decidable in ways that eiliical disputes are not. Of 
course some low level scientific questions can be 
answered in satisfyingly clear-cut ways. The question 
of whether a particular Tursiops brain weighs 1600 or 
1700 grams may be quite easy to answer. The question 
of the mean brain weight for adults of that species can 
also be answered, if not so easily. But consider tile 
following pair of questions. Is the weight of porpoise 
brains of any significance for our judgments of IX)rpoise 
intelligence? Is porpoise intelligence of any signif­
icance for our jUdgments of the moral status of 
porpoises? It is not at all apparent how we should even 
begin to search for answers to iliese questions. But it is 
not obvious that an answer to tile moral member of iliis 
pair need be any more elusive ilian an answer to tile 
scientific member. 
Many of the most interesting and important 
questions cannot be resolved by measurement. Take the 
opposition between evolutionary ilieory and so-called 
creationism. I am convinced of tlle reality of evolution, 
but I can point to no particular facts, and certainly to no 
measurements, that show creationism to be false. 
Creationism is a very poor theory despite the fact that 
it, in at least a minimal sense, accounts for all our 
observations and measurements. Creationism fails to 
cohere with the rest ofour scientific picture of the world, 
and it fails to provide genuine, non-question-begging 
expla..'1alions. To say that animals and plants are the way 
they are because God has made them that way has no 
explanatory power, for no matter how plants and 
animals were, such an "explanation" would account for 
it. An explanation that can be guaranteed to explain any 
conceivable phenomenon really explains nothing. 
When faced wiili two competing ilieories, one 
argues tlmt one is better than tlle other because it 
accounts for antecedent intuitions and observations of 
various sorts, because it coheres with oilier theories, 
because it is powerful in generating explanations, and 
so on. This is tlle way scientists argue every day. Such 
arguments are analogous to, and sometimes are, 
philosophical arguments. Philosophers argue for their 
Uleories in just iliese ways, that the theories account for 
our experience and for our antecedent beliefs, that they 
provide satisfying explanations of Ule phenomena. 
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Both scientific and philosophical Uleories sometimes 
have unintuitive implications. But if a theory is 
otherwise sufficienUy strong, it may force one to reject 
or revise Ule "intuitions," bc Uley moral or scientific, 
with which it conflicts. 
Progress in both science and ethics is a mailer of 
developing theories of increasing inclusiveness and 
coherence, theories Umt make sense of our intuitions 
and discipline them. We are an inquisitive species, and 
we want general explanatory theories bOUl of what Ule 
world is like and of what is right and wrong. We want a 
general account of goodness just as we want a general 
account of color; that's the kind of animal we are. 
Suppose someone were to object to my assimilation 
of eUlics to science by insisting on a fundamental 
difference in subject matter. Such an objector claims 
iliat Ule increasing coherence and inclusiveness of 
scientific theories is an indication of increasing 
adequacy because Ulere really are scientific facts. There 
is a world out there that we encounter at least 
occasionally and partially, and our increasing success 
in these encounters indicates Ulat our picture of the 
world is improving. But, says this objector, the 
increasing coherence and inclusiveness (if such Ulere 
is) of ethical Uleory is no guarantee Ulat such theory is 
any more than well-constructed myUl, for Ulere is no 
extcrnal moral world against which the meory is tested. 
This objection may be answered in two ways. First, 
one IIIay say Umt our moral intuitions give us Ule same 
evidence of an independent moral reality that our 
observations give us of scientific reality. Or, second (and 
these replies are not incompatible), it may be pointed 
out mat on some theories of science (e.g. those of Peirce 
and his successors) scientitic truUl is Ulat to which, in 
Ule ideal we hope to approach, all researchers agree. 
Emical truth can be, and has been, defined in the same 
way. What is right is what all fully informed, 
disinterested, rational observers agree to be right. 
But our objector may persist. "No," he or she may 
say, "there really is an objective physical world, as may 
be seen from Ule fact that people wiili false scientific 
beliefs fail to deal satisfactorily with their enviromnents, 
and UlOse with generally correct scientific beliefs 
minimize aversive experiences. In contrast, pcople willl 
opposed etllical views get along equally well, from 
which it may bc inferred Ulat Ulerc is no realm of 
objective moral facts." This is a plausible objection, 
but it may be rebuued from two ditIerent directions. 
First, better eUlical views may well have "survival 
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value," especially if me unit considered is a culture 
which espouses and inculcates me views. Contrary 
bOUl to some folk wisdom and some pop sociobiology, 
nice guys and nice societies don't always finish last. 
Since they are unlikely to destroy Illemselves, Uley 
may well finish first. Second, it is clear Ulat one may 
accept false scientific meories and still fare quite well. 
Millions of people believe fervenUy in contemporary 
astrology, surely one of me most ludicrous meories 
imaginable, without discernible decrease in life 
expectancy. Devoutly believing in Lysenkoist biology 
had great survival value in me Soviet Union for several 
decades. These are striking cases but not exceptions. 
Most humans can, and many do, live reasonably happy 
and successful lives while believing vast numbers of 
scientific and metaphysical (and emical) falsehoods. 
Curiosity, as I noted earlier, is characteristic of our 
species, and some of us have emphasized and 
formalized and disciplined this characteristic by 
becoming scholars. It is probably salutary, if depressing, 
to remind ourselves mat hundreds ofmillions (billions) 
of our conspecifics manage to build and repair 
automobiles, win friends and gain power, avoid walking 
into walls, and have and raise children without 
knowing or caring about the questions, and standards 
for answers, that we hold dear. One can tolerate, in oilier 
words, a large amount of bad theory, bom in emics and 
in science, without significant impact on one's chances 
of survival. In order to survive we need only do the 
right Uling most of the time. We need not do it for the 
right reason, or understand why it is me right mingo 
Correct (morally or scientifically) action may well 
generally have survival value, but correct explanation 
probably does not. 
I have not been arguing that emics is exactly like 
me sciences. That would be impossible, since ilie 
sciences are surely not exactly like one another. My 
claim is that ethics is, like physics and history and 
psychology and economics, an organized and rational 
inquiry into an aspect of Ille world we experience. It 
shares with other inquiries a structure in which meories 
arc constructed to account for data and data is screened 
and sorted in Ule light of theory. There is considerable 
deep disagreement in ethical meory at present, and there 
are issues about which contending parties care deeply. 
The same can be said of olller fields, past and present. 
There is no fundamental gap between science and emics. 
Let Ulat be enough talk about moral philosophy for 
now. It is time to do some. 
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II 
Any moral tlleory must include or presuppose some 
tl1eory of moral status. An entity may be a moral agent 
or a moral patient or both or neitl1er. A moral agent is 
sometl1ing capable of action, tl1e acts of which may 
properly be evaluated as right or wrong. My actions 
may correctly be so evaluated, but not tl10se of a very 
young child. The very young, tl1e insane, tlle severely 
retarded, and the comatose are not moral agents. 
Normal human adults are and so, perhaps, are adult 
animals of some otller species, and perhaps corpora­
tions and nations. 
A moral patient, on the other hand, is an entity the 
treatment of which may properly be evaluated as right 
or wrong. A human infant is not a moral agent but is a 
moral patient, for it does matter how an infant is 
treated. It is wrong to cause unnecessary pain to an 
infant, and wrong intrinsically. It may also be wrong to 
destroy my favorite pencil, but only derivatively, only 
because it makes me unhappy. The pencil is not a moral 
patient. Humans are, in general, moral patients and so 
are many other sorts ofanimals. It is wrong, intrinsically 
wrong, to cause gratuitous pain to a dog or a mouse or 
a porpoise or a seagull. 
Since we adult humans are typically both moral 
agents and moral patients, it is easy to overlook the 
distinction between agency and patiency in the moral 
realm. This can lead to serious confusion. I once heard 
a paper entitled "Etllics is to Govern Human Beings 
Only."4 This sentence is importantly ambiguous, for 
it may be taken to mean that only human beings can 
be moral agents (only tlley are morally responsible, 
only tl1ey can be governed by moral rules) or that only 
human beings can be moral patient" (only what is done 
to humans is of moral concern). Both of these inter­
pretations, I believe, yield false sentences, but the first 
is at least faintly plausible while the second is not. It 
is easy, if one is not clear on the agent/patient 
distinction, to transfer to the second reading some of 
tlle plausibility of tlle first. 
That otller animals as well as hum,ll1s are moral 
patients does not entail tllat they are entitled to equal 
moral concern. Not all moral patients are equal. This is 
widely but usually obscurely recognized. As a rational 
reconstruction of what I take to be common features of 
tbe views of most people today, I suggest the following 
"theory" ofmoral patients. Moral patients fall into tllree 
groups. Group A consists of persons in the moral sense 
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of the word. It is generally taken tl1at all and only 
humans are persons, but tl1is is surely false. Persons 
are botl1 moral agents and moral patients. They are 
possible contractors. Other moral agents, if there are 
any, such as corporations or states, are eitl1er denied to 
be moral patients at all or are placed in Group C. 
Group B consists of all other sentient beings. These 
entities can suffer, and suffering maners. They are, 
however, incapable of rational actions and, tl1us, cannot 
be moral agents. All sentient nonhuman animals are 
placed in this category. Group C consists of a 
heterogeneous collection tl1e members of which have 
in common iliat they are not sentient and tl1at they are 
thought by some persons (at least a few sane persons) 
to have intrinsic moral importance. Included here are 
species, cultures, states, laws, universities, ecosystems, 
and some specific physical objects such as particular 
old redwood trees, the Taj Mahal, and Michelangelo's 
Piera. Jeremy Bentl1am and many others would deny 
any intrinsic moral value to any of these, granting them 
at most derivative value consequent on their affecting 
or being valued by members of Groups A and B. Other 
tl1inkers hold some or all of tl1ese to be genuine moral 
patients in their own right. 1here are a number of very-­
basic, important, and difficult issues in moral theory 
involved in the countenancing of any moral patients in 
Group C. Fortunately, they need not be dealt with here, 
for our concerns are with Groups A and B and the 
relation between tl1em. 
Within Group A all moral patients are entitled to 
equal consideration. Each (human) person is taken to 
be of equal intrinsic value. Of course, if Jones is, and 
Smith is not, my parent, child, spouse, fellow soldier, 
fellow citizen, or one to whom I have made a promise, 
then my obligations to Jones may be stronger than my 
obligations to Smitl1. But in tl1emselves, as persons, this 
view ranks Jones and Smith as moral peers. 
Within Group B, in contrast, it is held that the moral 
status of creatures varies widely. Any Group B moral 
patient is, on this view, of vastly less significance tl1an 
any Group A moral patient (person). But within Group 
B, one moral patient (a cat, say) may be much more 
important morally tl1an anotl1er (a crab, perhaps). More 
serious justification is needed for harming or 
discomfiting the "higher" animals tl1an for harming the 
"lower." One general principle, accepted at least 
verbally by almost everyone who has considered it, is 
that pain should not be inflicted needlessly on any 
sentient being. A second principle is tl1at the higher 
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(more intelligent, more aware) the being, the more 
urgent must be the need in order to justify the infliction 
of harm or pain.5 
To this more or less "official" view most of us 
subscribe. But our actions belie our words. We tolerate 
abominations such as bull fighting, fox hunting, leghold 
trapping, and fur ranching, in all of which "higher" 
animals are tortured for entertainment or status-display. 
For the production of expensive pate de jois gras and 
inexpensive chicken eggs we permit torture and 
incredible confinement. We are, further, inconsistent. 
Some of us protest with shock and dismay the sale of 
horses for meat but do not hesitate to eat a hamburger. 
Some of us bemoan the sale of pound animals for 
research and buy cosmetics needlessly tested in the eyes 
of rabbits. The use of very intelligent animals such as 
rats and primates for trivial and repetitive research is 
protested only by a very few. 
Thus, even within the rational reconstruction of 
current moral sense that I have just sketched out there 
is a great deal of room for improvement in human 
treatment of nonhumans. But in fact the situation is 
much worse. For the assumption of a sharp break 
between groups A and B is spurious. It was clear to 
Aristotle and to many others before and since that 
humans are, after all, animals. Since the victory of 
Darwin, the fact that honw sapiens is one species among 
others has been part of the scientific outlook. It cannot 
plausibly be maintained, in the face of the science of 
the late 20th century, that there is a yawning gap 
between humans and the "merely sentient" rest of the 
animal kingdom.6 
Nor is it possible to arrange animals on a single scala 
natura with humans clearly and safely at the top. 
Animals, humans included, have many sorts of 
characteristics and capabilities. To map these would 
require n distinct continua or an n-dimensional 
continuum, with n some number over 20. It will not do 
simply to consider perception, for that resolves itself 
into the traditional five senses, plus echolocation, 
temperature sense, and several others, and then each 
category splits into three factors: range, sensitivity, and 
discrimination. What about locomotion? In what media? 
Speed or endurance? It seems clearly wrong to try to 
reduce intelligence to one measure, for we well know 
that we have not yet satisfactorily sorted out the varieties 
of human abilities covered by the tenn, and we have 
little reason to believe that the human varieties are the 
only ones there are. Similar remarks can be made about 
social behavior, communicative ability, manipulative 
skill, and tolerance of environmental change. There are 
other continua yet., such as longevity and fecundity. But 
we need not, fortunately, even attempt to discover how 
many such characteristics there are, for it is clear that 
not all differences between animals are morally 
significant. Consider the mouse and the bat. 
The mouse and the bat are in many ways alike and 
in many ways different. Ifwe plot their characteristics 
on our various dimensions or continua, we will [md 
that on some they occupy nearly or exactly the same 
spot., and on some they are far apart. Bats echolocate, 
but mice (like us) score a zero on that. Bats fly, mice 
don't. Despite the fact that bats and mice are very 
different in these ways, they have (at least approx­
imately) the same moral status. The different sensory 
and locomotor abilities of bats and mice are very 
important in making them the sorts of animals they are, 
making bats bats and mice mice. But in themselves these 
characteristics are of no moral importance. They may 
have some derivative moral significance. If, for 
instance, it is wrong to prevent a creature from moving 
in its natural way, then it is wrong to prevent bats from 
flying. But it is not wrong to prevent mice from flying. 
Still, the sensory and locomotor differences are not 
morally important per se. 
In those characteristics that are morally significant., 
here sentience, intelligence, and self-awareness, bats 
and mice are, to the best of our knowledge, close 
together. So bats and mice have the same moral status 
andare due the same sort ofconsideration from humans. 
Of this pair of animals, the mouse is much more like us 
than the bat., but we are not morally obliged to care 
more about the mouse than the bat. One cannot just 
identify "morally significant characteristics" and 
"characteristics similar to those of humans." 
Now suppose extraterrestrials to arrive from some 
distant star system. Suppose that they are intelligent, 
they are distinct individuals, and that they find some 
means of communicating with us. Beyond that, suppose 
that they are as different from us as you can imagine. 
They are predominantly gaseous, their chemistry is not 
based on carbon, their sensory apparatus is radically 
unlike ours and mostly operates on parts of the 
electromagnetic spectrum closed to us, and so on. But 
tlley are intelligent; they can communicate; they have a 
sense of self; and they are capable of suffering and 
enjoyment. 10ey are, in short, persons. Itmakes a great 
deal ofdifference how we treat them. Their moral status, 
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full personhood, is for many purposes far weightier than 
that of a mouse, despite tile fact that the mouse is 
enormously more like us. As many philosophers have 
been insisting for years, "human" and "person" do not 
express tlle same concept.? Given a choice between 
saving an irretrievably comatose human and one of these 
extraterrestrials, it would be wrong not to give 
preference to tlle extraterrestrial. The point is tllat 
morally relevant characteristics are a proper subset of 
all characteristics and are not those peculiar to humans. 
What characteristics are morally significant, tllen? 
There is no clear consensus among moral philosophers 
on tl1is question, but we can list some candidate 
characteristics. Sentience will appear on almost every 
list. By sentience is meant awareness of sensation and 
tlle ability to enjoy and to suffer. Those of us who tllink 
notlling of chopping up a live carrot but object to 
chopping up a live fish usually do so on tlle grounds 
that a fish is sentient and a carrot isn't. Otller candidate 
characteristics include memory, a sense of self, the loose 
cluster of abilities called "intelligence," ability to 
communicate, concern for conspecifics, playfulness, 
and possession of an inullortal soul. 
Almost all of these candidate (for moral signifi­
cance) characteristics are variable.8An aninlal mayhave 
a more or less definite sense of self, be more or less 
sentient, may communicate more or less broadly and 
flexibly. Most of these, in otller words, admit ofdegree. 
When one is ascribing some status, moral or otller, on 
the basis ofcharacteristics tllat can vary in degree more 
or less continuously, there is a strong temptation to a 
sort of fallacious reasoning I will call ''magic lines or 
slippery slopes." Consider tlle height of adult male 
humans. There is considerable variation among 
populations, but in almost any context, a man 135cm 
tall is short and a man 230cm tall is tall. It seems 
plausible to say tllat a man .lnull taller tllan a short 
man is short, and a man .1null shorter tllan a tall man is 
tall. A contradiction is easily obtained, for by adding 
and subtracting in units of .lmm it now can be shown 
tllat a man of any height one chooses is both tall and 
short. This sort of fallacy is the slippery slope. If one 
believes that slippery slopes can be prevented only by 
magic lines, one has to believe tl1at there must be some 
precise height which marks the boundary between tall 
and short, or more plausibly, two precise heights 
dividing the range into tall, medium, and short. In tllis 
case, however, it is quite obvious tllat there are no such 
magic lines. There are no sharp demarcations between 
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the short, the medium, and tlle tall. But some men are 
tall, some are short, and most are in between. There are 
no magic lines, but tlle slope is not slippery. 
In moral matters we seem particularly liable to this 
sort of fallacious tllinking. In tlle abortion controversy 
many find only extreme positions tenable, and others 
seek magic lines at conception or quickening or 
viability or birth. 
It is instructive to consider a concept much like many 
of the concepts of moral status, that of maturity. (In 
fact maturity is in part a matter of moral status.) Almost 
all of the factors relevant to maturity vary in degree. 
For several purposes it is necessary to stipulate magic 
lines for maturity. For most purposes, in the United 
States, one is counted as legally mature at age 18. But 
for marriage one may be counted as mature at age 16, 
and for the consumption of alcohol at 21. If someone 
were to ask "But what is tlle age at which one is really 
mature?," he or she would betray deep ignorance of 
tlle concept or of the facts. At 18 Elmo may be mature 
sexually and politically, immature emotionally, 
intellectually, and physically. Some never attain 
emotional and intellectual maturity but must be 
counted as full-fledged adults. Even if we have all 
possible information about Sally, and agreement that 
she is mature, it will still probably not be possible to 
say precisely when she became so. There certainly is 
such a state as maturity, but there are no magic line 
criteria for it. 
What is the application 'of all this to nonhuman 
animals? I want specifically to consider cetaceans, the 
whales and porpoises. What level ofmembership should 
they hold in the moral community? They obviously 
are sentient and, thus, moral patients of some sort. 
Even those few who favor continued whaling find it 
necessary to give at least lip service to the need for 
humane methods of killing. On the rational recon­
struction of popular views offered above (and rejected 
as inadequate) everyone would place cetaceans at least 
in Group B. Some, still within the person/nonperson 
framework, would argue that (at least some) cetaceans 
should be placed in Group A, Le., are persons. 
Champions of cetacean personhood point to a number 
of characteristics, including intelligence as shown in 
behavior and evidenced by large brains, complex social 
behavior including extensive mutual aid, playfulness 
both intra- and inter-specific, ability to communicate, 
interest in and solicitude for humans, inspiration ofawe 
in humans, and unique places in ecosystems. 
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I will set aside the last two items, because (a) that 
something inspires awe in humans does not even entail 
that it is sentient; consider the "starry heavens above 
and the moral law within" of Kant's famous line,9 and 
(b) as far as I can tell, everything that is part of any 
ecosystem has a unique place in that ecosystem. 
Of the remaining characteristics, no one, and no 
pair, will suffice to establish the personhood of 
cetaceans (or of anything else). Many animals, 
including insects, have complex social organizations 
with appropriate individual behavior. Some sort of 
communication has been observed in almost every 
vertebrate species, and notoriously in honeybees. Yet 
almost no one would suggest that the social and 
communicative honeybees are persons. Many animals 
play, and at least some (cats and dogs) play with 
members of other species. Many animals help one 
another. It is not uncommon, but it is futile, to attempt 
to find or construct a magic line in one or other of 
these characteristics. 10 
There remains intelligence. If information 
processing is central for intelligence, and intelligence 
criterial for personhood, it is but a short step to the 
question of rights for robots. If, on the other hand, 
one takes the adaptation of means to ends to constitute 
intelligence, then a vast number of species, including 
all the cetaceans, are well within Ule intelligent fold. 
But there are many varieties and aspects of intelligence, 
and even summing over Ulem all, intelligence isn't 
everything. This is, of course, my point; no single 
characteristic is everyUling. There are no magic lines 
dividing fields of moral status. 
Cetaceans are entitled to special moral consideration 
not because of some single characteristic but because 
they possess very high degrees of a number of morally 
important characteristics. They are highly intelligent, 
highly social, and capable of sophisticated conunu­
nication. It appears that at least some sorts of cetaceans 
may well have as much right to be considered persons 
as do humans. If, as I suggest. we abandon the sharp 
person/nonperson distinction, we can say tlml some 
cetaceans are at least quasi-persons. 
Similarly, tlle conclusion tlmt tlle great apes are at 
least quasi-persons is inescapable. They are highly 
intelligent, highly social, self-aware, communicative 
beings. Most of the rest of the primates probably deserve 
nearly the same status. Our mistreallnent ofow' primate 
cousins is even less excusable theUl our misu'eatment 
of cetaceans, since apes and monkeys are literally 
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anthropomorphic. They are so obviously close to us­
how can we use them as we do? 
How should we treat quasi-persons? Clearly their 
enjoyment and suffering matter and must be taken into 
account. But that is surely not enough. We owe more 
than just consideration, we owe respect. We must respect 
their interests and their autonomy. The first thing we 
must do in regard to cetaceans and apes is to let them 
be, let them live their own lives as they choose. When 
their interests and ours come into conflict, as is sure to 
happen from time to time, interests must be weighed as 
impartially as possible. We owe quasi-persons, as we 
owe persons, consideration, respect. and justice. 
There is no magic line between persons and the 
rest of tlle sentient world, and there are no magic lines 
witllin the sentient world. It is not just persons and 
quasi-persons but all conscious living things that are 
entitled, in many ways and to varying degrees, to 
consideration, respect, and justice. The levels ofmoral 
status are continuous, and can never reach zero while 
sentience remains. 
Nothing I have said in this paper answers any 
specific questions about human treatment of nonhuman 
animals. I hope to have helped make clear that these 
are genuine moral questions and that moral questions 
are genuine questions. 
Notes 
I This is a very extensively revised version of a paper, 
"Science, Ethics, and the Status of Cetaceans," written after 
a conference entitled "Cetacean Intelligence and Behavior 
and the Ethics of Killing Cetaceans," held in Washington, 
D.C., U.S.A., in 1980 under the auspices of the International 
Whaling Commission. 
2 For a useful survey and critique of modern ethics of 
virtue see Robert B. Louden, "Some Vices of Virtue Ethics," 
American Philosophical Quarterly, Vol. 21, NO.3 (July, 1984). 
3 Cora Du Bois, The People of Alor, (Minneapolis: 
University of Minnesota Press, 1944) (reprinted New York: 
Halper and Row, 1961), p. 106. 
4 Translated title of paper delivered at the conference 
referred to in note 1. 
5 Or death. But many would deny that it is wrong to kill a 
nonhuman animal, without denying that it is wrong to cause 
pain without need. 
6 Here and throughout this paper I am comparing adult 
animals of one species with adult animals of another. The 
questions of the moral status of nonhuman animals, of 
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(human) abortion, and of (human) infanticide are closely 
related; all concern standing in the moral community. At six 
weeks a human seems clearly inferior to a beagle of the same 
age in every morally relevant characteristic. Why then do we 
assign higher status to the human infant? Are we justified in 
doing so? I am glad to be able, on grounds of length, to exclude 
such issues from this paper. 
7 Of course the terms "human" and "person" are often 
used as synonymous, whether philosophers like it or not, but 
this causes considerable conceptual trouble. In Christian 
doctrine the three persons of the Trinity are all persons, but 
only one is human. On Star Trek the Klingons are persons, 
but not humans, and Mr. Spock is clearly a person although 
only half human. So, it is at least conceptually possible to be 
a person without being a human. That one may be a human 
without being a person is hotly denied in some quarters, 
affirmed in others. Fetuses and the comatose are central to 
this dispute. The less controversial cases of nonhuman persons 
suffice to show the need to separate these concepts. 
8 An exception is possession of an immortal soul. 
Presumably this is not a matter of degree--either one has 
such a soul or one does not. But if it is held that all humans 
have such a soul and no nonhuman animals do, it would appear 
that it is much worse to kill a porpoise or a pigeon than to kill 
a human. The human's soul, on this view, continues to exist, 
but to deprive the animal of bodily existence is to deprive it 
of everything. 
9 Critique ofPractical Reason, Conclusion, p. 161, Vol. 
V of the Prussian Academy edition. 
10 For example, those who would draw a magic line in 
communication, below which there is only signaling, and 
above which, in humans alone, lies true language, have been 
driven by ape language research to ever more desperate 
complications. Whatever can be found that at least some 
human linguistic behavior has and ape behavior lacks will be 
pronounced essential for 'real' language (until it is shown 
that the apes can do it). 
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